Using a conceptual framework and method combining ethical enquiry and phenomenology, we asked 73 senior baccalaureate nursing students to answer two questions: (1) What is nursing students’ experience of an ethical problem involving nursing practice? and (2) What is nursing students’ experience of using an ethical decision-making model? Each student described one ethical problem, from which emerged five content categories, the largest being that involving health professionals (44%). The basic nature of the ethical problems consisted of the nursing students’ experience (...) of conflict, resolution and rationale; 85% of the students stated that using an ethical decision-making model was helpful. Although additional research is needed, these findings have important implications for nursing ethics education and practice. (shrink)

Although older persons (aged 65 years and older) experience stressful ethical problems involving their health, research is lacking about this phenomenon. The purpose of this study was to describe and examine the content and basic nature of older persons’ ethical problems concerning their health. The conceptual framework and method combined ethical enquiry and phenomenology. The participants were 18 older persons and 12 of their children or grandchildren (for contextual understanding). The 19 women and 11 men, 73% of whom were Caucasian, (...) described 184 ethical problems, from which emerged 10 content categories. The basic nature of the ethical problems consisted of conflict, resolution and rationale. The results could assist health professionals to promote older persons’ ethical decision making, quality of life, and good death. (shrink)

This Korean study replicated a previously published American study. The conceptual framework and method combined ethical enquiry and phenomenology. The research questions were: (1) What is nursing students’ experience of ethical problems involving nursing practice? and, (2) What is nursing students’ experience of using an ethical decision-making model? The participants were 97 senior baccalaureate nursing students, each of whom described one ethical problem and chose to use one of five ethical decision-making models. From 97 ethical problems, five content categories emerged, (...) the largest being health professionals (69%). The basic nature of the ethical problems was the students’ experience of conflict, resolution and rationale. Using an ethical decision-making model helped 94% of the students. A comparison of the Korean and American results yields important implications for nursing ethics education, practice and research. (shrink)

We investigate how the perceived uncertainty of a conditional affects a person's choice of conclusion. We use a novel procedure to introduce uncertainty by manipulating the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. In Experiment 1, we show first that subjects reduce their choice of valid conclusions when a conditional is followed by an additional premise that makes the major premise uncertain. In this we replicate Byrne. These subjects choose, instead, a qualified conclusion expressing uncertainty. If subjects are given (...) a third statement that qualifies the likelihood of the additional premise, then the uncertainty of the conclusions they choose is systematically related to the suggested uncertainty. Experiment 2 confirms these observations in problems that omit the additional premise and qualify the first premise directly. Experiment 3 shows that the qualifying statement also affects the perceived probability of the consequent given the antecedent of the conditional. Experiment 4 investigates the effect of suggested uncertainty on the fallacies and shows that increases in uncertainty reduce the number of certain conclusions that are chosen while affirming the consequent but have no effect on denying the antecedent. We discuss our results in terms of rule theories and mental models and conclude that the latter give the most natural account of our results. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Rebirth of Cool:Toward a Science SublimeE. David Wong (bio)We love and hate "the cool." As educators, few things are more coveted than being recognized as teaching the "coolest" class in the school. We look forward to the rare moment when students gasp in awe or scream in amazement. However, in the quiet that returns after the last student rushes out the classroom door, we may feel an (...) uneasy ambivalence. Perhaps we admonish ourselves that serious science is substantial, enduring, and intellectual. We wonder whether our "cool" class was merely superficial, fleeting, and mindless.In this article I examine the cool—this idea we love and hate—and assert its importance in science education. I acknowledge that some experiences can be engaging but are superficial and unimportant—this is the "merely cool." By contrast, some experiences are deeply moving because we feel a growing capacity to perceive meaning and value in the world—this is the "sublimely cool." I draw from philosophy, literature, psychology, and aesthetics to build connections between cool and sublime experiences. By highlighting the surprisingly substantial connection between the cool and sublime, I hope to bring greater depth to the meaning of "cool," this imprecise, but honest, term. I also take care to define sublimely cool experiences in science as having a direct relationship with subject-matter understanding. It is true that the full meaning of aesthetic experiences extends beyond the grasp of words and conceptualization; however, it is equally true that knowledge and reason are central to all worthwhile experiences. The expansion of meaning and perception, not just intense sensation or emotion, is the heart of the sublimely cool experience. Nobel laureate physicist Richard Feynman provides a personal example of how his knowledge of science enhances his sublimely cool experience of Nature: "Poets say science takes away from the beauty of the stars—mere globs of gas atoms. Nothing is 'mere.' I too can see the stars on a desert night, and feel them. But do I see less or more? The [End Page 67] vastness of the heavens stretches my imagination—stuck on this carousel my little eye can catch one-million-year-old light."1Cool as a Sign of Compelling Experience"Cool" is an intriguing expression for it is at once both crude and incisive. On the one hand, "cool" is a colloquial term used by people of all ages and backgrounds in many contexts to describe many things. So wide and informal is its use that "cool" may seem trite and banal. "Cool" is rarely chosen carefully when used: indeed, it is more often an unintentional, reflexive utterance.Thus, the more one thinks before speaking, the less likely "cool" will be used. Nonetheless, because it is an impulsive expression, "cool" may be all the more honest. Dewey made a similar point in his observation of the word "beauty": "Beauty... is properly an emotional term, though one denoting a characteristic emotion. In the presence of a landscape, a poem or a picture that lays hold of us with immediate poignancy, we are moved to murmur or to exclaim 'How beautiful.' The ejaculation is a just tribute to the capacity of the object to arouse admiration that approaches worship."2 With "just tribute" Dewey emphasizes the honesty of the term. By "admiration that approaches worship," Dewey reminds us that the spontaneous uttering of "beautiful" is a sign that a powerful experience has been had. I will make a similar argument that the term "cool"—although common and ordinary—can signal the having of a compelling experience. As a compelling experience, the cool becomes an important resource for teachers.Dewey goes on to describe how the meaning of "beauty" has, unfortunately, lost its value to aesthetic theoreticians: "Beauty is at the furthest remove from an analytic term, and hence from a conception that can figure in theory as a means of explanation or classification. Unfortunately, it has been hardened into a peculiar object; emotional rapture has been subjected to what philosophy calls hypostatization, and the concept of beauty as an essence of intuition has resulted. For purposes of theory, it then becomes an obstructive term."3Because of the way they are... (shrink)

The forms of words as they appear in text and speech are central to theories and models of lexical processing. Nonetheless, current methods for simulating their learning and representation fail to approach the scale and heterogeneity of real wordform lexicons. A connectionist architecture termed thesequence encoderis used to learn nearly 75,000 wordform representations through exposure to strings of stress‐marked phonemes or letters. First, the mechanisms and efficacy of the sequence encoder are demonstrated and shown to overcome problems with traditional slot‐based (...) codes. Then, two large‐scale simulations are reported that learned to represent lexicons of either phonological or orthographic wordforms. In doing so, the models learned the statistics of their lexicons as shown by better processing of well‐formed pseudowords as opposed to ill‐formed (scrambled) pseudowords, and by accounting for variance in well‐formedness ratings. It is discussed how the sequence encoder may be integrated into broader models of lexical processing. (shrink)

This article offers a critical examination of the notion of the common good in Catholic social ethical teaching, comparing this concept with utilitarianism and examining parallels between them and common critiques of both. Rather than focusing on the common good and trying to reach agreement on its content as a maximum standard for persons and communities in society, we argue that it is preferable to focus on the common harm. The common harm serves as a minimum standard of what causes (...) harm to individuals and communities in society and should be avoided. The common harm provides both a conceptually sound and practically achievable construct for contributing positively to the social ethical discussion in an increasingly secular society. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 13.4 : 617–623. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume on Natural Belief and Original Principles Miriam McCormick David Hume discusses anumber ofimportantbeliefs that, althoughhe himselfnever uses the term, commentators have come to call "natural beUefs." These beliefs cannotbejustified rationally but are impossible to give up. They differ from irrational beliefs because no amount of reasoning can eliminate them. There is general agreement that such a class of beliefs exists for Hume. There is differing opinion, (...) however, concerning which beliefs count as "natural." In particular, there has been much debate as to whether beliefin God is "natural" for Hume. Much of this disagreement concerning natural beliefs arises because not enough attention is paid to the different uses of"natural" in Hume. On his analysis, certain characteristics may be called "natural" insofar as their causes are found in human nature. These characteristics can be explained by reference to what Hume calls the original principles ofhuman nature. But they need not be necessary or unavoidable. It is only the original principles themselves, for Hume, that are universal and necessary for all human beings. And it is only those beliefs which necessarily result from original principles that are "natural" in a second sense: these beliefs are, according to Hume, "inseparable from the species." Only beliefs which are natural in this second sense are indispensable despite their lack ofrational grounds. Certain other beliefs, such as belief in God, are "natural" in some weaker sense, but are often taken to be "natural" in this second sense. My aim is to distinguish the different senses of"natural" for Hume and so determine which beliefs are "natural" in which senses. Natural belief Norman Kemp Smith was the first to discuss the existence ofa special class of beliefs in Hume.1 Kemp Smith first uses the term "natural beUef" in reference to the beliefin the existence ofbody. This belief, he says, is a natural belief"due to the ultimate instincts or propensities that constitute our human nature" (Kemp Smith, 151). Furthermore, this particularbeUefis not founded on reason or sense experience, yet no amount ofreasoning will cause us to give it up.2 "Certain beliefs or judgments," says Kemp Smith, "can be shown to be 'natural', 'inevitable', indispensable' and are thus removed beyond the reach of sceptical doubt" (p. 152). Two other beliefs which Kemp Smith says Volume XLX Number 1 103 MIRIAM McCORMICK Hume considere natural are belief in causal action and belief in the identity or unity ofthe self. The primary purpose of Kemp Smith's article is to demonstrate "that the establishment of a purely naturalistic conception ofhuman nature by the thorough subordination ofreason to feeling and instinct is a determining factor in Hume's philosophy" (p. 150). He developed this thesis in reaction to T. H. Green and other commentators who had claimed that Hume "merely develops to a sceptical conclusion the principles which he inherits from Locke and Berkeley" (Kemp Smith, 149). The discussion of "natural belief " is meant to show that Green is mistaken when he claims that Hume denies the existence of the external world and ofthe self. It is true that Hume says reason will not show us that such things exist. But because reason is not supreme for Hume, says Kemp Smith, we need not worry that such beliefs are not justified. Because Hume does not encourage us to give up such fundamental beliefs or even think that such an enterprise is possible, Kemp Smith maintains that, rather than being sceptical about such beliefs, Hume defends them from sceptical attack. There are certain behefs that it makes no sense to question. The doctrine of natural belief serves as an illustration of Kemp Smith's claim that Hume subordinates reason to feeling and instinct. Because his discussion òf "natural belief" is used mainly to illustrate a particular point, Kemp Smith does little more than offer a description of such beliefs. He tells us that these beliefs are inevitable and indispensable, but he does not indicate how one determines which beliefs are natural. Criteria are given for what Hume counts as a natural belief, but the means for determining ifa belief satisfies these criteria are not offered. With the publication of R. J. Butler's article, "Natural Belief and the Enigma... (shrink)

The six commentaries raise five issues about multi-level selection theory that we attempt to address: (1) replicators without vehicles, (2) group selection and movement between groups, (3) absolute versus relative fitness, (4) group-level psychological adaptions, and (5) multi-level selection as a predictive theory.

The use of remember–know judgments to assess subjective experience associated with memory retrieval, or as measures of recollection and familiarity processes, has been controversial. In the current study we had participants think aloud during study and provide verbal reports at test for remember–know and confidence judgments. Results indicated that the vast majority of remember judgments for studied items were associated with recollection from study , but this correspondence was less likely for high-confidence judgments . Instead, high-confidence judgments were more likely (...) than remember judgments to be associated with incorrect recollection and a lack of recollection. Know judgments were typically associated with a lack of recollection , but still included recollection from the study context . Thus, although remember judgments provided fairly accurate assessments of retrieval including contextual details, know judgments did not provide accurate assessments of retrieval lacking contextual details. (shrink)

Catholic ethical teaching has increasingly relied on a concept of the common good for making and evaluating social decisions. The authors have argued that the common good is a maximal and ideal concept about which people and communities differ fundamentally. In practice, it does not resolve moral and social disagreements. The concept of the common harm is preferable because it is a minimal standard that can be more clearly identified and agreed for individuals and society, providing a basis for legislative (...) and social action. Bioethics and public health both have strong roots in doing no harm and preventing harm to both individuals and communities in society. The authors argue that the application of the concept of the common harm from these disciplines into wider use in the health professions and public policy would be beneficial. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 14.3 : 449–455. (shrink)

This paper examines a range of issues concerned with the process of choosing schools in the private and state sectors at the primary/pre‐preparatory stage and at the time of transfer to secondary/senior school. The findings indicate that choices about schools are made at different times and in different ways by parents who use the state and private sectors. One of the key findings is that the process of choosing a school begins earlier in the private than in the state sector; (...) another is that quality of education is cited more frequently as one of the ‘top three’ essential factors by parents of children in the private sector. At both the primary and transfer to secondary stages, very high percentages of parents consider it essential that their child should be happy. A discussion of the different notions that private school and the state school parents may have of ‘happiness’ is offered. (shrink)

Durante a Idade Média, de todas as formas de vivência religiosa, uma se destaca, vista como a mais perfeita, a mais próxima de Deus: o Monaquismo. Os monges aparecem aos olhos dos contemporâneos como anjos, vivendo, ainda na carne, as delicias do Paraiso. Tal ideia construída, paulatinamente, ao longo dos tempos, ganha no século XII o seu mais tenaz e incansável defensor, o cisterciense Bernardo de Claraval. Este age para impor a supremacia do Monaquismo à Igreja e ao conjunto da (...) sociedade cristã, objetivando fazer dos monges os seus guias e diretores. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Nel 1545, dalla tipografia di Damiano de Turlini a Brescia, usciva un volume contenente due operette: la prima intitolata _Un brieve trattato dell’eccellentia delle donne_ composta dal filosofo lombardo Vincenzo Maggi; la seconda, anonima, con il titolo: _Una brieve essortatione a gli huomini_. Vincenzo Maggi, con un trattato –come lui stesso dichiara– breve e semplice, confuta il disprezzo verso il genere femminile imperante nella sua epoca, spinto dalla necessità di ritrovare la verità. Il tutto senza screditare né le tesi avverse (...) né i maschi; anzi, con l’intenzione di convincere costoro ad apprezzare ancor di più le donne e riconoscerne i superiori meriti. L’autore anonimo, invece, pretende smentire le affermazioni del filosofo lombardo esortando gli uomini all’azione, e si dichiara intimorito dall’idea che le donne possano prendere il sopravvento. È nostra intenzione analizzare le due opere presentandone le argomentazioni e i modi in cui esse vengono esposte, nonché offrire una breve biografia di Vincenzo Maggi oltre ad affrontare l’argomento della paternità della seconda opera. (shrink)

A moving cultural biography of abolitionist martyr John Brown, by one of the most important African-American intellectuals of the twentieth century. In the history of slavery and its legacy, John Brown looms large as a hero whose deeds partly precipitated the Civil War. As Frederick Douglass wrote: "When John Brown stretched forth his arm... the clash of arms was at hand." DuBois's biography brings Brown stirringly to life and is a neglected classic.

: The two main psychological theories of the ordinary conditional were designed to account for inferences made from assumptions, but few premises in everyday life can be simply assumed true. Useful premises usually have a probability that is less than certainty. But what is the probability of the ordinary conditional and how is it determined? We argue that people use a two stage Ramsey test that we specify to make probability judgements about indicative conditionals in natural language, and we describe (...) experiments that support this conclusion. Our account can explain why most people give the conditional probability as the probability of the conditional, but also why some give the conjunctive probability. We discuss how our psychological work is related to the analysis of ordinary indicative conditionals in philosophical logic. (shrink)

Kant è stato il principale riferimento epistemologico di quella ricerca sui fondamenti della matematica che ha avuto in Gottlob Frege il suo massimo esponente. In seguito, tuttavia, al tramonto dei programmi logicista, intuizionista e formalista, l'esigenza di garantire la certezza della matematica passa in secondo piano rispetto al problema della natura degli enti matematici. E in tal modo che, almeno a livello terminologico, Platone subentra a Kant come essenziale referente di una diversa costruzione epistemologica. Terreno fertile della ricerca fondazionale diviene (...) infatti, a partire dagli anni '60, il dibattito fra i sostenitori e gli avversari del 'platonismo matematico': etichetta che, utilizzata per indicare la trascendenza degli enti matematici, ha non di rado banalizzato o reso marginale l'originario pensiero di Platone. Il dibattito è ancor oggi un crogiolo di idee e tendenze, tra le quali emerge, accanto alla necessità di un maggiore approfondimento dei risultati e della reale attività del matematico, l'opportunità di interrogare i testi del filosofo greco. Nella sterminata letteratura contemporanea sui fondamenti della matematica, Platone e Kant si presentano, dunque, come problematici fili d'Arianna per orientarsi, mettere ordine, cogliere una linea evolutiva o anche soltanto originali spunti teorici per nuovi orizzonti. (shrink)